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Widespread organized and violent public dissent triumphed over 
authoritarian suppression in the founding struggle of the United States. In a 
prompt act of historical irony, criticism of the state was quickly outlawed in 
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Despite expiring in 1801, the Alien 
and Sedition Acts introduced a repressive approach to dissent that has 
persisted throughout U.S. history.1 Judges took over a century to read 
meaningful protections into the First Amendment.2 Today, there is a right to 
dissent established in First Amendment doctrine that includes the right to 
assemble, to engage in protected speech and conduct, and to publish without 
fear of prior restraint or government reprisal. However, a new wave of 
repression will test the viability of modern legal standards in an era where 
the other branches of government are again displaying great hostility 
                                                
d1 John Loranger is a member of the Class of 2018 at CUNY School of Law. He will 
be joining Brooklyn Defender Services as a staff attorney in the Family Defense Practice in 
September 2018. The author would like to thank the entire Footnote Forum section of the 
CUNY Law Review, as well as JP Perry, Mackenzie Lew, Susa Maltz, and Professor 
Ruthann Robson. A special thanks to Princess Masilungan for bringing this note to fruition 
and her invaluable assistance and collaboration in the process.  
1 The extensive political repression carried out by federal and state executive agencies 
at various points throughout United States history against dissenters should be 
acknowledged as closely interwoven with the work of the legislative branch. This paper 
focuses on present-day, state level legislative enabling of repression and potential future 
responses by the judiciary. For a detailed presentation of an integrated history, see 
generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY (2008).  
2 See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT xiii (2007). 
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towards free speech rights and many who practice them.  
The legal mechanism of repression, the national security state, has 
grown exponentially in size and power since September 11, 2001, signaling 
a devaluation of First Amendment protections in favor of notions of 
security.3 The Patriot Act and dramatic growth of state surveillance, lawful 
and not, have combined with a more permissive social attitude towards 
concentrated power in state security agencies, creating the most adverse 
conditions for dissenters in decades.4 Legislation proposed with a public 
target identified by its authors is deemed content-neutral, and federal courts 
uphold regulations on demonstration zones they admit resemble 
“internment camp[s]” and are “offense[s] to the spirit of the First 
Amendment,” as reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.5 Police 
departments are armed to the hilt with billions of dollars in military grade 
equipment.6  
Despite these conditions, a growing number of social movements are 
thriving in the face of serious repression. There were over 600 arrests of 
people resisting the Dakota Access Pipeline in North Dakota alone, 
including felony charges for civil disobedience such as locking down to 
construction equipment.7 At the presidential inauguration in 2017, over 200 
people were arrested and were charged with felonies.8 A superseding 
indictment including new felony charges now places hundreds of people at 
risk of spending decades in prison.9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
                                                
3 MICHAEL RATNER & MARGARET RATNER KUNSTLER, HELL NO: YOUR RIGHT TO 
DISSENT IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA 26-39 (2011). 
4 See id. at 16-39, for an outline of the conditions of dissent in the United States after 
September 11, 2001.   
5 See Coal. to Protest Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 
61, 74, 76 (D. Mass. 2004).  
6 See Matt Apuzzo, War Gear Flows to Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 
2014), https://perma.cc/N2ZA-2RDW (“During the Obama administration, according to 
Pentagon data, police departments have received tens of thousands of machine guns; nearly 
200,000 ammunition magazines; thousands of pieces of camouflage and night-vision 
equipment; and hundreds of silencers, armored cars and aircraft.”); see also Christopher 
Ingraham, The Pentagon Gave Nearly Half a Billion Dollars of Military Gear to Local Law 
Enforcement Last Year, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/DLZ9-MHWF (“The 1033 program has transferred more than $4.3 billion 
in equipment since its inception in 1997.”). 
7 See Colin Moynihan, A Murky Legal Mess at Standing Rock, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 
2017), https://perma.cc/38RN-E8VS; Max Grossfeld, Protester Arrested After Handcuffing 
Himself to Backhoe to Halt Dakota Access Pipeline Construction, WEST DAKOTA FOX 
(Aug. 31, 2016, 10:14 AM), https://perma.cc/QVX7-Z5MN. 
8 Natasha Lennard, How the Government is Turning Protestors into Felons, ESQUIRE 
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/6UJU-RS2U. 
9 Patrick Strickland, ACLU Sues D.C. Police Over Violence at Anti-Trump Rally, AL 
JAZEERA (June 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/SJ4J-68FM (“Most of the charges against the 
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(“F.B.I.”) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, involving an array of federal, state, 
and local agencies, have turned their attention to social justice movements 
such as Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and #NODAPL.10 Police 
departments across the country have been caught spying on Black Lives 
Matter organizers, often using sophisticated technology such as Sting-Rays 
to monitor the communications of demonstrators.11 Like the years of 
COINTELPRO, use of informants and undercover infiltrators is 
widespread, although revelations of infiltration have centered on local 
agencies.12 Law enforcement and military contractors are partnering to 
suppress domestic movements.13 The ascendancy of authoritarian and white 
nationalist narratives, such as the “paid protester” and “war on police” 
tropes,14 have emboldened lawmakers to target dissent. 
In this context, legislators in at least twenty-two states across the 
country are continuing the longstanding U.S. tradition of responding to 
dissent with repression, proposing a climbing total of over fifty repressive 
bills since 2016.15 These bills range from relieving motorists who strike 
protesters in the roadway of liability to seizing the assets of anyone police 
can arrest at a protest deemed unlawful.16 Over a dozen bills have been 
withdrawn or failed after strong public opposition, underscoring the legal 
reality: the best opportunity to defeat repressive legislation is often prior to 
its passage.  
                                                                                                                       
defendants carry maximum sentences that range between 70 and 80 years in prison.”).  
10 George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since 
Ferguson, INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://perma.cc/KTE5-XWR7; Sam 
Levin, Revealed: FBI Terrorism Taskforce Investigating Standing Rock Activists, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/KDX2-JP2R. 
11 See, e.g., Elyssa Cherney, Chicago Lawyer Files Federal Lawsuit Over Police 
Cellphone Tracking System, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 13, 2017, 3:17 PM), 
https://perma.cc/P7ZK-7F7P; Joseph, supra note 10; George Joseph, Undercover Police 
Have Regularly Spied on Black Lives Matter Activists in New York, INTERCEPT (Aug. 18, 
2015, 5:27 PM), https://perma.cc/QAM8-N9N2. 
12 See, e.g., Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All Over Northeast, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2012), https://perma.cc/QQA3-P3KD (discussing how the 
NYPD infiltrated Muslim student groups far outside New York City, even recording how 
many times a day students prayed).  
13 Alleen Brown et al., Leaked Documents Reveal Counterterrorism Tactics Used at 
Standing Rock to “Defeat Pipeline Insurgencies,” INTERCEPT (May 27, 2017, 8:04 AM), 
https://perma.cc/TS8Y-6NKM. 
14 See Allie Conti, Why the Ridiculous ‘Paid Protester’ Myth Refuses to Die, VICE 
(Mar. 1, 2017, 7:12 AM), https://perma.cc/596U-4NYC; Dan Berger, Op-Ed, A Brief 
History of the “War on Cops”: The False Allegation that Enables Police Violence, 
TRUTHOUT (July 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/K9NG-HGFF. 
15 See infra Appendix A.  
16 Traci Yoder, New Anti-Protesting Legislation: A Deeper Look, NATIONAL LAWYERS 
GUILD (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:32 PM), https://perma.cc/WD6Z-4ZNJ. 
22 CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM [Vol. 21:1 
This paper reviews and analyzes a sample of these proposed bills vis-à-
vis current First Amendment law. After a brief introduction to relevant law, 
I will address the most novel and constitutionally suspect measures, which 
impose major financial liability on demonstrators. Next, bills that create 
new criminal offenses or increase penalties for extant offenses, which are 
severe but less constitutionally suspect, will be examined. Then, I will 
briefly discuss driver liability bills, which have mainly been defeated by 
public outcry and are legally problematic, before closing with a discussion 
of recent anti-masking legislation and its historical context. I argue that this 
legislation is ripe for challenge.  
Overall, while First Amendment frameworks exist to mount a strong 
challenge to many of the most authoritarian of the proposed measures, 
critical doctrinal safeguards have been eroded. Two major areas of concern 
are the content-based inquiry and the narrow tailoring requirement of 
incidental burdens on protected speech and time, place, or manner 
restrictions. In a broader social and political context where growing dissent 
is countered by official claims that it is disloyal and specious, history 
illustrates that the First Amendment cannot be relied on as a bulwark to 
blunt repression in a systematic or effective way.    
 
BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
The First Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment and made applicable to the states in 1925.17 Ideally, people are 
protected by the First Amendment even when their speech makes them 
unpopular with leaders of the state or a majority of the public: “The 
Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the 
peaceful expression of unpopular views.”18 This can be true even when 
speech provokes a condition of unrest. In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 
the Supreme Court wrote: 
 
The vitality of civil and political institutions 
in our society depends on free discussion. . . . 
The right to speak freely and to promote 
diversity of ideas and programs is therefore 
one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart 
from totalitarian regimes.  
 
                                                
17 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
18 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (overturning convictions of 
Black citizens demonstrating against discrimination for breach of the peace after they 
refused to disperse from Capitol grounds and instead sat and sang songs).  
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Accordingly a function of free speech under 
our system of government is to invite dispute. 
It may indeed best serve its high purpose 
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or 
even stirs people to anger. Speech is often 
provocative and challenging. It may strike at 
prejudices and preconceptions and have 
profound unsettling effects as it presses for 
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of 
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless 
protected against censorship or punishment, 
unless shown likely to produce a clear and 
present danger of a serious substantive evil 
that rises far above public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under 
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. 
For the alternative would lead to 
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, 
courts, or dominant political or community 
groups.19 
 
As a corollary, the government must be prevented from inhibiting speech 
merely because it finds doing so convenient: “the prime objective of the 
First Amendment is not efficiency.”20  
Another pillar of First Amendment doctrine is the prohibition on 
government regulation of expression due to its message, ideas, or subject 
matter, known as the requirement of content-neutrality.21 Statutes that are 
not content-neutral are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict 
scrutiny; they therefore “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest.”22 Facially content-based laws are immediately 
subject to strict scrutiny, and a facially neutral law will be adjudicated as 
content-based and subject to strict scrutiny if it cannot be justified absent 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, or is enacted due to 
disagreement with the content of speech subject to regulation.23 If a facially 
                                                
19 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (citations omitted).  
20 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540 (2014). 
21 See id. at 2529-30.  
22 Id. at 2530 (citation omitted).  
23 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989)). Here, a majority of the Court backed a 
more rigorous inquiry into the question of facial neutrality, finding Gilbert’s sign code 
made facial distinctions and failed strict scrutiny for its underinclusion. Id. In overturning 
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neutral law is demonstrated to favor or facilitate a certain speaker while 
stopping others when it is applied, this is impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination, an “egregious form of content discrimination.”24    
Far from all speech is protected. Fighting words, true threats, fraud, 
defamation, and obscenity are all categorically excluded from the First 
Amendment’s umbrella.25 Even if expressive conduct falls outside one of 
these categories, it may not be considered speech within the ambit of 
protection. The test is whether the speaker engaged in the expressive 
conduct with the “intent to convey a particularized message . . . and in the 
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it.”26  
Furthermore, “incidental limitations” on protected expression are 
justified when expressive and non-expressive actions are  combined in a 
single course of conduct and the government has a “substantial or 
important” interest at stake.27 In such cases, assuming the underlying power 
to regulate, the action is constitutional when “the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”28 In the case that established 
this doctrine, United States v. O’Brien, the preservation of draft cards to 
ensure their “continued availability” for the smooth functioning of the 
Selective Service system was facially unrelated to expressive conduct and 
served “a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system’s 
administration."29 Finally, the Court could “perceive no alternative means 
that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of 
issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their willful 
                                                                                                                       
the Ninth Circuit decision that found the code facially content-neutral and constitutional, 
Reed signals the possibility of a less bleak path for challenges to arguably facially 
discriminatory statutes. See id. at 2227-31. 
24 Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
25 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (internal citations omitted).  
26 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (overturning as a violation of 
right to free speech student’s conviction for hanging an American flag with an upside-
down peace symbol attached outside of window of apartment in wake of the killing of 
students at Kent State University by the National Guard and the U.S. invasion of 
Cambodia).  
27 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“This Court has held that 
when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can 
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
28 Id. at 377. 
29 Id. at 377-78.  
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mutilation or destruction.”30   
As technological capacity and resources for state security forces to 
suppress dissent increased dramatically in the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court declared those who wish to express their views in public are 
worthy of receiving the height of constitutional protection.31 The Court 
reasoned that traditional sites of public dialogue, known as public forums, 
occupy a “special position in terms of First Amendment protection.”32 
These spaces, such as streets and parks, “have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”33 Due to their central importance in the free 
exchange of ideas the First Amendment protects, in these places, “the 
government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very 
limited.”34 
Despite lofty rhetoric, extensive and severe regulations on speech 
activity in streets and other public fora may be upheld as legitimate time, 
place, or manner restrictions, for example under the doctrine governing 
competing uses of public space.35 These regulations are constitutional if 
they “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . 
. . they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” 
and the regulation leaves “open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”36 To satisfy the narrow tailoring 
requirement, the regulation cannot “burden substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests,” which could 
range from ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of 
traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, to protecting 
women’s freedom to access pregnancy related services.37 If there are 
alternative measures that “burden substantially less speech,” the 
government must show those alternative measures “would fail to achieve 
the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is easier.”38 
                                                
30 Id. at 381. 
31 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to 
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity 
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional 
system.”).  
32 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). 
33 Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).  
34 Grace, 461 U.S. at 177. 
35 See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., 
concurring).  
36 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted). 
37 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014). 
38 Id. at 2540.  
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PROTESTER LIABILITY & ASSET SEIZURE STATUTES 
  
Relatively few bills regarding protester liability and civil asset seizure 
exist, but the proposals are draconian. While many have been defeated, in 
August 2017, Pennsylvania Republicans proposed a bill making protesters 
liable for police overtime, medical and emergency response, and other 
“public safety response costs” if they are convicted of a felony or 
misdemeanor stemming from the demonstration.39 Across the country in 
Arizona, S.B. 1142, which was propelled through the State Senate in the 
2016-2017 legislative year by Republicans who claimed that people are 
paid to riot, would have made riot a racketeering offense.40 This would have 
allowed police to arrest organizers prior to a protest, or to subject them to 
liability for damages caused by others.41 The bill was publicly shelved by 
Arizona’s Speaker of the House after mass outcry.42 In North Carolina, H.B. 
249, entitled “Economic Terrorism,” proposes sweeping changes to the 
criminal code.43 Among them is liability for all “public safety response 
costs” incurred for anyone convicted of obstructing traffic or participation 
in an unlawful assembly.44 Similarly, Washington State Senator Doug 
Ericksen introduced S.B. 5009, a sweeping bill enhancing penalties for 
crimes involving “economic disruption.”45 Ericksen first promised a 
measure to fight “economic terrorism,” but retreated from this language 
after condemnation by the local media, civil society, and advocates.46 The 
bill essentially creates a new offense of “economic disruption,” which 
operates as a mandatory sentencing enhancement if the prosecution alleges, 
and the judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying 
offense was committed to cause an economic disruption.47 Restitution may 
be ordered up to “double the amount of the defendant’s gain or victim’s 
                                                
39 S.B. 754, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Pa. 2017); see also Zaid Jilani, New Bill 
Would Force Arrested Protesters to Pay Police Overtime, Other Fees, INTERCEPT (Aug. 
23, 2017, 4:12 PM), https://perma.cc/RTH8-HXCU. 
40 S.B. 1142, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017). 
41 See Ray Stern, Plan a Protest, Lose Your House: Arizona Senate Passes SB 1142 
Charging ‘Provocateurs’ With Racketeering, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 11:06 
AM), https://perma.cc/EBQ5-UTRE (discussing implications of S.B. 1142, a bill written by 
a former police officer and motivated by the idea of the paid protestor). 
42 See id.  
43 H.B. 249, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
44 Id.  
45 S.B. 5009, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). 
46 Jim Brunner, Trump Supporter in State Senate Says Some Protests Are ‘Economic 
Terrorism,’ Should Be Felonies, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016, 8:33 PM), 
https://perma.cc/LA2Y-M28R. 
47 S.B. 5009, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). 
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loss.”48 Senator Ericksen stated that the main targets of his bill are members 
of the climate movement, specifically those who block oil trains.49 
On May 15, 2017, Oklahoma’s governor signed H.B. 2128.50 The law is 
aimed at people accused of trespass and anyone who “compensates . . . or 
remunerates” trespassers, a testament to the potency of the paid protester 
trope.51 People arrested or convicted of trespassing are now liable for any 
“damages to personal or real property while trespassing.”52 
Minnesota’s legislature is considering measures that could, 
theoretically, quickly push even well-heeled demonstrators into bankruptcy: 
H.F. 322 and corresponding S.F. 679. The bills would make any person 
convicted of participating in, or being present at, an “unlawful assembly,” 
or of committing a “public nuisance” civilly liable for “public safety 
response costs.”53 The text does not delineate any share or apportionment of 
costs, implying each person could be held liable for the entire sum.54 Public 
safety response costs generally run into the tens of thousands, if not 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Bloomington police, for instance—a 
single agency of several that responded—logged $25,000 in personnel and 
overtime costs alone responding to a December 2014 Black Lives Matter 
protest at the Mall of America.55 The bill’s author, former law enforcement 
official and sponsor of other legislation targeting protest, Nick Zerwas, 
explained that his constituents’ feelings motivated him to introduce H.F. 
322: “I have an entire constituency that feels as though protesters believe 
that their rights are more important than everyone else’s. . . . Well, there is a 
cost to that. Rosa Parks sat in the front of the bus. She didn’t get out and lay 
down in front of the bus.”56 Misrepresenting the nature of the Civil Rights 
                                                
48 Id.  
49 Essex Porter, Protest Bill Creates Crime of ‘Economic Terrorism’, KIRO 7 (Nov. 18, 
2016, 9:41 AM), https://perma.cc/G8EY-4ER9. 
50 See H.B. 2128, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
51 Id.  
52 Id.   
53 H.F. 322, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017); S.F. 679, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 
2017). 
54 S.F. 679, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017); see also H.F. 322, 90th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Minn. 2017).  
55 State Representative Nick Zerwas, Press Release: Rep. Zerwas Introduces 
Legislation Relating to Unlawful Assembly, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 10, 
2016), https://perma.cc/3QVE-RTG7; see also Associated Press, Chanting ‘Black Lives 
Matter,’ Protesters Shut Down Part of Mall of America, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/KUH4-A4FR. Representative Zerwas is the son of a long-serving 
Minnesota police chief and worked as a print examiner in a forensics crime lab prior to 
being elected. See About Nick Zerwas, ZERWASFORHOUSE.COM, https://perma.cc/Q248-
Y6TT (last visited Nov. 18, 2017). 
56 Jared Goyette, Minnesota Bill Would Make Convicted Protestors Liable for Policing 
Costs, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2017, 8:54 AM), https://perma.cc/EX2Y-5T2S (quoting 
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Movement, while nodding to the legitimacy of protest, Zerwas weaponized 
history in his attempt to justify severe penalties for modern civil and human 
rights activists. 
Regardless of any difference in liability imposed among the bills, one 
avenue for immediately challenging any of these bills is that they are 
unconstitutionally overbroad, inevitably ramming headlong into not only 
lawful but especially protected First Amendment activity. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that a law may be facially invalid against the 
First Amendment if “a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep.”57 There is a “plain requirement for laws and regulations to be 
drawn so as to give citizens fair warning as to what is illegal; for regulation 
of conduct that involves freedom of speech and assembly not to be so broad 
in scope as to stifle First Amendment freedoms, which ‘need breathing 
space to survive.’”58 
There are arguments against Oklahoma’s bill on these grounds if it can 
be effectively demonstrated a far larger amount of protected activity is 
punished than what is legitimately targeted. Liability is not moored to 
proven illegal conduct, but only an accusation in the form of an arrest; 
under the new law, people may be sued for damages from a crime the 
criminal court finds they did not commit. More people are arrested for 
trespass than are convicted. 
Furthermore, people who have never set foot on the property in question 
could be lawfully sued for damages if they have “compensated or 
remunerated” people who did cause the damage for trespassing or people 
the state accuses, but never proves, caused the damage (people arrested but 
never convicted).59 Many environmental organizations and unaffiliated 
groups of activists set up online fundraising pages to fund their campaigns, 
which often include notice of the group’s intent to engage in civil 
disobedience such as trespassing on company easements to lock down to 
construction equipment. Thousands of people donate to these pages; if a 
donor’s money is distributed to individuals arrested for trespassing on a 
natural gas pipeline construction site in Oklahoma, and damage is caused, it 
seems that under this scheme, a donor who has “compensated or 
remunerated” the arrestee for the trespass could be amenable to a civil suit; 
thus, a person in Alaska could be sued by an oil company in Oklahoma for 
                                                                                                                       
Representative Nick Zerwas). 
57 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). 
58 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 433 (1963)). 
59 See H.B. 2128, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
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giving money online for “legal support” to an environmental activist 
through a third party, who declared their intent to use civil disobedience to 
fight a pipeline, without any further knowledge about the campaign or the 
activist’s specific plans. A reasonable person would not be aware of such 
liability. This “compensation” provision is almost certainly an 
unconstitutionally overbroad restriction on the rights to free speech and 
association given the vast amount of lawful conduct it opens to liability. 
Despite the Oklahoma law’s end run around the proof required for the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, its individual liability section is 
likely to withstand facial challenge on overbreadth grounds as, on its face, 
civil liability for individual trespassers has little to no impact on protected 
speech. The legislature seems to do be doing little more than codifying the 
common law tort of trespass. However, it is worth noting that under current 
law, property owners may be compensated for damages by trespassers 
through criminal court-ordered restitution as part of a plea or sentencing, 
and under this law, individuals who were wrongfully arrested could find 
themselves defending against civil suits merely because they were easily 
identifiable to a property owner.  
In Minnesota, H.F. 322, if passed, should be found unconstitutional as a 
content-based statute that fails strict scrutiny as underinclusive. While 
facially neutral, its main sponsor justifies the bill with reference to certain 
content of speech that will be burdened outside the four corners of the 
document. Examining the “subjective” motives behind H.F. 322,—like the 
sponsor’s stated intent—leads to a more accurate, honest assessment of 
content-neutrality than an “objective” one focused on the literal phrasing of 
the statute or the legislative history. This is especially true when motive is 
used as a threshold issue in determining how to examine the government’s 
proffered justifications.60 Besides his quip about Rosa Parks, Zerwas has 
made multiple comments demonstrating that he is targeting the Black Lives 
Matter movement and advocates for police accountability, despite 
averments of neutrality.61 If the content-based distinction was a meaningful 
safeguard, H.F. 322 would need to survive strict scrutiny—a nearly 
impossible task given “it must be the least restrictive means of achieving a 
                                                
60 See Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
936, 967-81 (1987) (arguing for a balancing model for questions of free speech where a 
holistic, subjective motive inquiry is a threshold question for determining burdens, by 
asking whether improper motivations played a substantial part in the government’s 
decision to regulate). 
61 See, e.g., State Representative Nick Zerwas, supra note 55 (referencing three Black 
Lives Matter-affiliated protests as the impetus for the bill); Tim Nelson, Activists, DFLers 
Push Back Against Bill to Hold Protestors Liable for Costs, MPRNEWS.ORG (Jan. 24, 2017, 
10:20 AM), https://perma.cc/F352-WVYB (“Zerwas cited protests at the Mall of America, 
the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport and on interstates 35W and 94.”).     
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compelling state interest.”62  
Even accepting fiscal responsibility as a compelling interest, holding 
individual protesters convicted of misdemeanors liable for massive sums of 
aggregate costs far beyond what they can be reasonably responsible for is 
not a narrowly tailored way of addressing said interest. There are many 
other ways the municipality could choose to save money to help with public 
safety response costs. Most directly and effectively, law enforcement could 
stop responding to demonstrations with staggeringly expensive numbers of 
police officers, especially where the demonstration includes civil 
disobedience.63 Deploying police in such large numbers often leads to the 
intensification of conflict, cycles of escalation, and the perceived need for 
additional expenditure.64 H.F. 322 contributes directly to this problem 
because it incentivizes police to declare protests to be unlawful assemblies 
and subsequently arrest as many people as possible in the hopes of securing 
convictions and, thus, imposing liability. In other words, the bill opens the 
door to policing protests for profit, a potentiality ripe for abuse.65 This 
incentivization is compounded by the reality that the police themselves are 
presently the focus of sustained protected speech campaigns, including 
those highly critical of police departments, the criminal justice system, and 
elected officials. The bill thus represents a serious threat of chilling speech 
because of the supposed benefits of repression to state apparatus in this 
context.66 The bill is also glaringly underinclusive—practically all crimes 
have public safety response costs associated, yet the bill singles out three, 
all closely associated with protesting. Given this, the serious incidental 
impacts and potential for abuse, and the less burdensome alternatives, the 
means chosen do not narrowly fit the stated goal. 
However, as a general matter, courts have found targeted laws to be 
                                                
62 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).  
63 See, e.g., Rocco Parascandola & Barry Paddock, Police Protests Have Cost City 
$22.9M Overtime for NYPD, Bill Bratton Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014, 2:52 
AM), https://perma.cc/V22P-QDS5; Thomas Dresslar, How Many Law Enforcement 
Agencies Does It Take to Subdue a Peaceful Protest, ACLU (Nov. 30, 2016, 5:30 PM), 
https://perma.cc/U6R6-4LD8. 
64 See MIKE KING, WHEN RIOT COPS ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE POLICING AND 
REPRESSION OF OCCUPY OAKLAND 23-46 (2017). 
65 See, e.g., DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: 
THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 2-3 (2d ed. 2015), https://perma.cc/W254-FX2K 
(documenting the explosive growth of civil asset forfeiture after Congress, in 1984, gave 
agencies a financial stake in forfeiture by permitting revenue to flow back to individual 
departments).  
66 See Minneapolis NAACP condemns HF322, MINN. NAACP (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7WAR-WYXL (pointing out that Minnesota is home to some of the 
country’s most severe racial disparities and condemning H.F. 322 as an attempt to silence 
those fighting to close that gap). 
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content-neutral after cursory analysis.67 In doing so, they decline to engage 
in any type of holistic inquiry into legislators’ motives, mainly because of 
the difficulty of proof and judicial reticence to attribute constitutional 
insufficiency to individual lawmakers.68 
While “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is 
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys . . . [a] regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it 
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”69 
This can be true even where the motive of the bill’s main sponsor is 
suppression based on content of speech: in evaluating whether the law is 
justified without reference to content, the court can focus on the asserted 
governmental purpose in the most general sense, not the justifications 
provided by individuals that compose the government and who may have 
written the law. The legislature is easily able to re-package an individual 
lawmaker’s malicious or suppressive intent into a legitimate public policy 
goal while the court turns its eye to the possibility of unconstitutionality. 
For example, in O’Brien, the Court found that the governmental interest 
was content-neutral and unrelated to the communicative aspect of O’Brien’s 
act of burning his draft card, let alone to the suppression of free expression. 
They derided the idea of motive analysis in the circumstances:  
 
What motivates one legislator to make a 
speech about a statute is not necessarily what 
motivates scores of others to enact it, and the 
stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew 
guesswork. We decline to void essentially on 
the ground that it is unwise legislation which 
Congress had the undoubted power to enact 
and which could be reenacted in its exact 
form if the same or another legislator made a 
‘wiser’ speech about it.70 
                                                
67 See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content 
Approach to Protect Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1368-72 
(2006); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-based/Content-neutral and 
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 602-606 (2003).  
68 See Zacharias, supra note 60, at 946 (noting that the application of motive analysis 
has been inconsistent across contexts: in O’Brien, perhaps representing the context of street 
protest, the Court has foresworn subjective motive analysis for the objective purpose 
inquiry, but in the context of draft reclassifications cases such motive analysis was a 
controlling factor, and in the whistleblower context it has played a limited but clear role). 
69 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  
70 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).  
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The Court was not interested in including Congressional speeches about the 
need to punish hippies and draft dodgers in its analysis in any substantive 
manner.71 
The court hearing a challenge to H.F. 322 could easily proceed in this 
manner and find the legislation content-neutral. It would then likely analyze 
it under O’Brien and its progeny as a government regulation that 
incidentally burdens protected activity. The first issue would be whether the 
law was unrelated to the suppression of speech based on its effect and 
degree of impact.72 Minnesota would certainly argue that any incidental 
burden on speech due to a vague chilling effect would be minor, and the 
government’s interest in addressing the rising fiscal cost of protests is 
substantial and legitimate, just like the smooth operation of the Selective 
Service system in O’Brien. However, the potential chilling effect of such a 
law is enormous given the lack of control a single individual has over 
whether the police declare a protest a nuisance or unlawful assembly, and 
also given the criminal and financial penalties for anyone convicted of a 
minor misdemeanor stemming from such a declaration. However, similar 
arguments have a mixed record of moving the needle to a finding of 
purposeful suppression in this context.73 Ultimately, a court would balance 
the deterrent effect of the law on protected activity with the weight of 
government interests, and likely conclude the law is sufficiently unrelated to 
suppression.74 The final hurdle would be finding the scheme appropriately 
narrow, or whether “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”75 
While the language of the test sounds promising for challengers to such an 
underinclusive statute, in truth this would not be much of a hurdle at all 
because this prong (and indeed the entire test) has devolved into a form of 
much more lenient scrutiny, akin to rational basis review.76 On this track, it 
is not a far stretch to conclude that H.F. 322, like the regulation prohibiting 
the destruction of selective service cards, is one focused solely on the 
                                                
71 See id. at 383 (“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous 
matter.”). 
72 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-15 (1982).   
73 See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. 
L. REV. 1473, 1484-85 (2013). 
74 See id. at 1494.  
75 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.   
76 See David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
491, 506-29 (1988), for a detailed discussion of this deterioration. See also Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Acad. And Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006) (citation omitted) (“We 
have held that ‘an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore 
is permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”).  
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noncommunicative, criminal aspect of a protester's conduct, and any 
incidental burdens on speech are not greater than necessary to further the 
government interests in both fiscal health and lawful behavior.77 
In analyzing S.B. 5009 in Washington State, what should be noted first 
are the mandatory, inalterable sentencing enhancements to be “served in 
total confinement” for crimes attempted or committed with an intent to 
cause “economic disruption.”78 The bill would amend state restitution law 
to allow for up to “triple the amount of the offender’s gain or victim’s loss” 
to be charged to any person who is “convicted of or pleads guilty to a 
criminal offense in which there has been a special allegation that the person 
committed the offense to cause an economic disruption.”79 According to the 
bill, a person attempting to or causing an economic disruption intends to: 
 
(a) Influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; and 
(b) Obstruct, hinder, or delay the passage of 
any train, truck, car, ship, boat, aircraft, or 
other vehicle or vessel engaged in the 
carriage, hauling, transport, shipment, or 
delivery of goods, cargo, freight, or other 
item, in commerce; or 
(c) Interferes with, tampers with, damages, or 
obstructs any pipeline facility, bulk oil 
terminal, marine terminal, tank car, 
waterborne vessel or barge, or power 
plant.80  
 
There is a strong argument that the law is unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment as overbroad due to the sweeping breadth of the definition 
of “economic disruption.” The bill’s backers certainly anticipate First 
Amendment challenges and have inserted several disclaimers they hope will 
assuage concerns courts may entertain. For example, the bill’s first section 
states: “The legislature recognizes and fully supports the ability of 
individuals to exercise their rights of free speech, press, and peaceful 
assembly . . . . The legislature finds, however, that there is no right to harm 
another person or prevent another person from exercising his or her 
                                                
77 See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1200-10 (1996) (discussing O’Brien’s incidental burden doctrine on the right to 
speech and fundamental rights in general). 
78 S.B. 5009, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
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rights.”81 Later, after setting out the sentencing enhancements provision, the 
bill concludes that section with another disclaimer: 
 
This offense does not include any activity that 
is reasonably construed as persons engaged in 
lawful activity including: Law enforcement 
activity; construction; repair; maintenance; 
utility work; a lawful strike or picketing; 
peaceful protest; other authorized or properly 
permitted conduct; or persons investigating or 
reporting criminal conduct or illegal activity 
to proper authorities.82   
   
The state would certainly argue that these disclaimers defeat accusations of 
overbreadth by narrowing the legitimate sweep of the statute. While 
challengers on overbreadth grounds bear a heavy burden83 of showing 
“substantial overbreadth,” even a prohibition on unprotected speech (or 
conduct) cannot save a statute that prohibits or chills a substantial amount 
of protected speech.84 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court was 
very clear: “The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means 
to suppress unlawful speech.”85 
The main issue is whether the statute actually prohibits (here, punishes) 
protected speech. The answer must unequivocally be yes, and a substantial 
amount. First, it is practically impossible to imagine a scenario in which this 
enhancement stems from an arrest made anywhere but some type of protest, 
demonstration, or other politically motivated action. Second, Ericksen’s 
own admission that the bill is inspired by climate justice activists confirms 
the legislation is aimed at political speech and other First Amendment 
protected activity.86 
Consider the following common scenario: A demonstrator at a Black 
Lives Matter demonstration in Seattle is charged with misdemeanor assault 
                                                
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003) (dictum) (“Rarely, if ever, will an 
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed 
to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or 
demonstrating).”). 
84 “[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go 
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted   
. . . .” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (quoting Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)). 
85 Id.  
86 Porter, supra note 49.  
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on a police officer, and the prosecutor alleges the crime was committed with 
an intent to cause economic disruption because the demonstrator intended to 
influence the policy of the federal government by intimidation or coercion. 
This intent can be inferred from the defendant’s allegedly violent conduct at 
a demonstration. First, even if the court declined to make such a finding, if 
the defendant pleaded guilty to the assault, they would be liable for triple 
restitution because they assaulted a police officer at a political 
demonstration and not randomly on the street. This is the baseline fact 
giving the prosecutor ammunition to make the allegation. Thus, the 
enhancement illicitly punishes protected speech alongside unprotected 
conduct. 
In the second scenario, the demonstrator goes to trial to fight the charge. 
She is in the profound bind of defending against the assault charge, while 
also affirmatively proving to the judge that if the assault were committed, it 
was not with the intent to cause an economic disruption. Perhaps the 
defense is misidentification—the defendant simply did not do it. In this 
case, the defendant must waive any opportunity to present evidence to the 
judge regarding her intent because her argument against the main charge is 
that she never had any. Alternatively, if the defendant acted in self-defense, 
while she will have the opportunity to present evidence of a wholly 
different intent to the judge, she runs the high risk of being perceived by the 
jury in a highly negative light, undermining her ultimate chance of acquittal. 
If the defendant is ultimately convicted, she will face the sentencing 
enhancement and triple restitution upon a judicial finding of economic 
disruption by a preponderance of the evidence. This result could be 
reasoned as simply as: Because the defendant was present at a 
demonstration with the goal of influencing government policy, and was 
convicted of a crime reasonably construed as intimidating or coercive, the 
crime was more likely than not committed with the intent to cause 
economic disruption. In other words, the statute encourages the conflation 
of an individual’s perceived motivation for engaging in protected political 
activity with their intent while engaging in unlawful action. Thus, the 
statute places a burden on these hypothetical defendants to prove their 
speech is not unlawful, a constitutionally dubious situation.87 Such 
conflation of this double mens rea requirement is even easier when the 
offense is something like pedestrian interference or obstruction, two other 
common protest related charges, and the theory is economic disruption 
through the blocking of some vehicle of commerce.  
Thus, without even addressing the chilling effect of the statute, the court 
should find it void for overbreadth.  
                                                
87 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255 (“The Government raises serious constitutional difficulties 
by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful.”).   
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Challengers could also argue that the law is facially content-based and 
thus deserving of strict scrutiny because the sentencing enhancement for 
crimes intended to cause economic disruption is predicated on the abstract 
beliefs of the defendants—essentially any belief that would drive someone 
to engage in public political action.88 The government would maintain that 
the law is content-neutral, analogizing to Wisconsin v. Mitchell, and argue 
the sentencing enhancement does not represent punishment of protected 
beliefs, but rather “special harms distinct from their communicative 
impact.”89 In Mitchell, a defendant faced a hate-crime sentencing 
enhancement because he selected his victim on account of race. The Court, 
noting that motive is a traditional and proper factor for sentencing judges to 
consider, reasoned that the Wisconsin legislature’s desire to address special 
harms perceived from the commission of bias-motivated crimes, such as 
increased likelihood of criminal retaliation, the infliction of distinct 
emotional harm, and the stirring of community unrest, provided “an 
adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and above 
mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs or biases.”90 Perhaps tellingly, 
rather than focus on such special harms in the first section of the bill, 
Ericksen solemnly swore S.B. 5009 does not target protected activity.91 
Regardless, the government could argue that these special harms include 
economic losses, incitement to community unrest, and others. Despite the 
seeming absurdity of comparing the broader effects of crimes motivated by 
bigotry against individuals to crimes committed while demonstrating or 
protesting, the special harms could certainly be accepted.92 If the law is 
found to be content-neutral, it will likely survive under incidental regulation 
analysis, and if it is found to be content-based, it will very likely fail strict 
scrutiny. 
In conclusion, the bills creating some form of liability for protestors in 
Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Washington, while rife with serious 
constitutional issues, are by no means guaranteed to sink under the weight 




                                                
88 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) (“[A] defendant’s abstract 
beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a 
sentencing judge.”) (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992)). 
89 Id. at 484 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).  
90 Id. at 488.  
91 See Porter, supra note 49. 
92 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). The Court 
seems to closely analogize “special harms” to “secondary effects” that also serve as 
justifications for the neutrality of content-based regulations. See id. 
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THE CREATION OF OFFENSES AND INCREASED PENALTIES 
 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the right to dissent exists in the realm of 
increased penalties for already extant offenses and the creation of new 
ones.93 Including the overlapping Washington and North Carolina statutes 
discussed above, at least eighteen states have proposed over thirty bills 
either creating new offenses, increasing penalties, or both. The most 
creatively punitive was Oregon’s S.B. 540, which would have required 
public colleges and universities to expel any student convicted of riot, and 
failed in committee.94 However, due to the continued relevance of public 
streets and highways as sites of high profile discourse on matters of public 
concern,95 state legislators have focused heavily on regulating 
demonstrators in the streets, and specifically on those blocking traffic.96  
Generally, state legislatures have wide latitude to codify criminal 
offenses and set penalties. While challenges are certainly possible, many of 
the still active or signed bills are very likely to be upheld, such as the ones 
increasing penalties for existing obstruction laws. “Aggravated offenses” 
with higher penalties for crimes against law enforcement or other public 
officials are common and well within the power of the legislature, meaning 
Georgia’s “Back the Badge Act of 2017” is likely constitutional.97 Of the 
fourteen bills in this category that have already failed or been tabled or 
withdrawn, many had strong chances of being upheld, such as increased 
penalties for unlawful assembly, or making it a felony to tamper with oil 
and gas equipment. The mass picketing bills, such as the North Dakota 
bill98 creating the felony of direct or indirect economic harm and the South 
Dakota bill99 requiring the elimination of “no-go zones,” were much more 
suspect due to their potential overbreadth and high burdens on protected 
activity. 
                                                
93 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its 
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path 
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”). 
94 S.B. 540, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017).  
95 See, e.g., Emily Badger, Why Highways Have Become the Center of Civil Rights 
Protest, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/BJS2-A7VT 
(discussing the blocking of highways across the United States by racial justice advocates in 
protest of recent police brutality, especially against Black youth). 
96 Thirteen states have passed legislation that regulates demonstrators that block traffic. 
See infra Appendix B. 
97 S.B. 160, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017). 
98 H.B. 1193, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017).  
99 H.B. 1145, 2017 Legis. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017).  
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Several of the bills in the category of increased penalties and new 
offenses appear especially susceptible to First Amendment challenges. One 
example is Florida’s S.B. 1096, a restriction on political speech in a 
traditional public forum, that would have made it a misdemeanor to 
interfere with or impede the flow of traffic on any road or highway during 
an unpermitted march or demonstration.100 The bill, which failed in 
committee in May 2017, thus functionally prohibited all unpermitted 
marches or demonstrations in the streets and facially implicated First 
Amendment protected activity.101  
South Dakota’s S.B. 176 (“the Act”), signed into law on March 13, 
2017, is another one in the group that appears especially open to First 
Amendment challenges.102 One avenue is an overbreadth and vagueness 
challenge.103 Content-based arguments are also available. Most likely, the 
bill will be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. 
The first section of the Act is the most suspect, allowing the county 
commissioner to deny use of public lands under their control if they, along 
with the governor and sheriff, deem it necessary “to preserve the 
undisturbed use of the land by the lessee or if the land may be damaged by 
the activity.”104 A challenger could argue that this is a de facto permitting 
scheme, based on undefined notions of a danger of damage to the land.105 
South Dakota has not articulated specific factors for government officials to 
consider when making such a decision. Instead, the law creates a sweeping 
mechanism through which the governor, sheriffs, and county land 
commissioners have nearly unbridled discretion to shut down all activity, 
including First Amendment speech, by groups of more than twenty people 
on public lands, a scheme the Court recognizes as ripe for unconstitutional 
                                                
100 S.B. 1096, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
101 See id. 
102 S.B. 176, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017). 
103 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) (“[T]he 
Court has permitted a party to [facially] challenge an ordinance under the overbreadth 
doctrine in cases where every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression of 
ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker.”); 
see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“Although ordinarily ‘[a] 
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the 
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others,’ we have relaxed that requirement 
in the First Amendment context, permitting plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad 
because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of protected speech.”) 
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 
(1982)). 
104 S.B. 176, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017). 
105 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (“It is not merely the sporadic 
abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that 
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.”).  
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abuse.106 While such discretionary schemes and prior restraints are by no 
means automatically void, there is a strong presumption of invalidity 
against them.107 According to the Act itself, it is “necessary for the 
immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety,” and an 
“emergency” exists by its declaration.108 Yet there is no actual emergency 
cited or described by the bill—indeed there is none available for reference. 
The law is in anticipation of protests that “need to be controlled,” as 
Governor Dennis Daugaard’s Chief of Staff, Tony Venhuizen, explained to 
the Associated Press.109 Even assuming the blanket significance of 
government interests in protecting the use of the lessee or preventing public 
land from damage, the section should not be found to be narrowly 
tailored.110 The sections granting powers to the Secretary of Transportation 
are attackable from similar angles. Finally, individual rules promulgated 
under the Act may provide additional material for challenges in short order. 
However, it is very plausible a court would decline to find that S.B. 176 is a 
de facto licensing scheme. Under existing precedent, it might not be too far 
of a reach to conclude that it is constitutional as either an incidental burden, 
or a content-neutral, time, place, or manner restriction.    
 
DRIVER LIABILITY BILLS 
 
Besides Florida, four other states have considered bills relieving drivers 
of liability for striking demonstrators: North Dakota,111 Tennessee,112 
Texas,113 and North Carolina.114 These bills have received sharp public 
outcry and all appear to be floundering, especially after anti-racist protester 
Heather Heyer was killed by a neo-Nazi car attack in Charlottesville, 
                                                
106 See id. at 97-98 (“[A] statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory 
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their 
displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that 
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.”).  
107 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.”).  
108 S.D. S.B. 176. 
109 North Dakota Pipeline Protest Spurs South Dakota Legislation, CBS MINN. (Feb. 
15, 2017, 8:03 PM), https://perma.cc/97HY-VFA9.  
110 See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (2004) (“Excessive 
discretion over permitting decisions is constitutionally suspect because it creates the 
opportunity for undetectable censorship and signals a lack of narrow tailoring.”).  
111 H.B. 1203, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017). 
112 H.B. 668, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017); S.B. 944, 110th General 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017). 
113 H.B. 3432, 85th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).  
114 H.B. 330, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
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Virginia, on August 12, 2017.115 
North Carolina’s H.B. 330, the only bill that appears to have a chance of 
becoming law after passing the North Carolina House, is susceptible to a 
strong challenge as a content-neutral regulation that “incidentally” burdens 
protected speech. The bill should fail even the Rumsfeld / Albertini iteration 
of the O’Brien test because it cannot be said that the “regulation promotes a 
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.”116 This is because North Carolina adheres to a pure 
contributory negligence rule. If the injured party is found to be responsible 
for any fault in a negligence action, the defendant will not be liable for 
damages. Thus, the bill does nothing to advance any assumedly legitimate 
government interest in protecting drivers who exercise due care from civil 
liability. Because the bill does not impact the current operation of North 
Carolina law, but burdens protected speech in a severe manner, an inference 
should arise that the bill is at its core related to the suppression of free 





Missouri and North Dakota are the two most recent states adding or 
considering criminal penalties for wearing a mask. Missouri’s H.B. 179, in 
committee, makes it a class A misdemeanor to conceal one’s identity during 
an unlawful assembly or riot “by the means of a robe, mask, or other 
disguise.”117 North Dakota’s Governor signed H.B. 1304 into law on March 
2, 2017.118 It outlaws the wearing of a “mask, hood, or other device that 
covers, hides, or conceals any portion of that individual’s face:  
 
a. With the intent to intimidate, threaten, 
abuse, or harass any other individual;  
b. For the purpose of evading or escaping 
discovery, recognition, or identification 
during the commission of a criminal offense; 
                                                
115 Lauren McGaughy, Texas Lawmaker: Bill to Protect Drivers Who Hit Protesters 
Would Not Apply to ‘Jackass’ Charged in Charlottesville Murder, DALLAS NEWS (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://perma.cc/6YHQ-F7SC.  
116 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67 
(2006) (“We have held that ‘an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, 
and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a 
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.’”) (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).   
117 H.B. 179, 99th General Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017).  
118 H.B. 1304, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017). 
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or  
c. For the purpose of concealment, flight, or 
escape when the individual has been charged 
with, arrested for, or convicted of a criminal 
offense.”119   
   
Its main sponsor, Republican Representative Al Carlson, maintained the bill 
was concerned with safety, stating, “I would be the first to defend your right 
of free speech . . . I’m always concerned when there’s a reason that . . . may 
be used to hide your identity when you’re creating some kind of 
disturbance.” He cited examples of people fighting the Dakota Access 
Pipeline by “cutting razor wire and burning tires,”120 and maintained no 
protest with masked people could be peaceful: “That’s not a peaceful 
protest . . . . It might be legal in Baghdad but not in Bismarck.”121    
Anti-masking statutes have existed in many states for decades and are 
also known as “KKK laws,” referencing the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”). In 
1951, Georgia made it illegal to wear a mask on public property, or while 
on private property without permission. The statute was upheld against a 
First Amendment challenge by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1990.122 
Applying the O’Brien framework regarding regulation of mixed speech and 
non-speech elements, the court found that the law was passed to protect 
Georgia’s citizens from violence and terror at the hands of the Klan, restore 
confidence in law enforcement, and safeguard civil rights—these interests 
were not only substantial but compelling and the constitutional duty of the 
state.123 It found the law was content-neutral, proscribing “menacing 
conduct without regard to the particular message of the mask-wearer.”124 
However, the statute outlaws, without any further qualifications, wearing a 
mask on public property or private property without permission.125 It does 
not require an intent to intimidate, harass, or threaten. This means the court 
must conclude that wearing a mask outside one of the named exemptions is 
                                                
119 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-15 (2017). 
120 John Hageman, Constitutionality of Mask Bill Debated in North Dakota 
Legislature, WEST FARGO PIONEER (Jan. 24, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://perma.cc/BGD2-
2T6C. 
121 Nick Smith, Bill Would Ban Protesters from Using Face Masks, BISMARCK 
TRIBUNE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/HS69-L8FW.  
122 State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669 (1990).  
123 Id. at 672-73.  
124 Id. at 673.  
125 See GA. CODE ANN., § 16-11-38 (West 2017). The statute includes exemptions for 
holidays, Mardi Gras celebrations, masquerade balls, sports, and state activities such as 
emergency response drills. See id. 
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inherently menacing.126 
Such a sweeping assumption is faulty ground from which to build strong 
legal analysis and could be disproven by a challenger that does not belong 
to the KKK but wears a mask as expressive conduct.127 Further, under 
North Dakota’s statute, demonstrators committing no independent crime, 
but who are wearing a bandanna at a march on the sidewalk, could be 
arrested under the anti-masking statute as acting with intent to intimidate 
law enforcement under subsection (a). The law gives prosecutors an 
additional charge that increases a potential sentence used as leverage to 
make defendants plead out or cooperate. These facts point to a strong 
chilling effect that can be leveraged against the law in overbreadth and void 
for vagueness challenges.  
In New York, anti-masking legislation has been on the books since land 
revolts prior to the Civil War during which tenant farmers would wear 
masks in their appropriation and defense of land from the owners of “vast 
manorial estates.”128 Well over a century later, KKK members attempting to 
hold a rally in full regalia brought a facial challenge to the present version 
of that legislation, New York Penal Law §240.35(4), after they were 
informed by the NYPD in response to their permit application that their 
plans to wear masks would violate the criminal code.129 The District Court 
found that the wearing of masks was protected by the right to anonymous 
speech, grounded in NAACP v. Alabama, and thus the regulation had to face 
strict scrutiny, which it failed.130 The Court also applied O’Brien analysis 
and found the statute was not narrowly tailored to a significant or 
substantial government interest because the statute was not tied to criminal 
conduct by the wearer.131 It also found the statute facially invalid as a 
content-based regulation that applied to political speech but not masks for 
entertainment.132 Finally, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York concluded that New York City engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination by applying the statute to the Klan but not similarly situated 
                                                
126 See Miller, 260 Ga. at 671-72 (“A nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the 
human heart. But, remove the mask, and the nightmarish form is reduced to its true 
dimensions.”).  
127 See Monika Nickelsburg, A Brief History of the Guy Fawkes Mask, MENTAL FLOSS 
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/7BQE-CJGN (providing a brief history of the symbolism 
of the Guy Fawkes mask, including their widespread use at Occupy protests as a symbol of 
anti-authoritarianism and of everyday people resisting a tyrannical government). 
128 See Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 203-05 (2d Cir. 
2004) (overviewing a brief history of anti-masking legislation).  
129 Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 232 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), rev’d and remanded, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
130 Id. at 213-15.  
131 Id. at 217.  
132 Id. at 218-19.  
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groups.133  
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that while the regalia of the 
KKK—the robe, mask, and hood—were indeed expressive conduct that 
qualified for protection, the mask itself was optional for group members and 
therefore not an integral part of the expression.134 Rather, it was 
“redundant,” and had no independent message, and “where . . . a statute 
banning conduct imposes a burden on the wearing of an element of an 
expressive uniform, which element has no independent or incremental 
expressive value, the First Amendment is not implicated.”135 Thus, an 
O’Brien analysis was unnecessary.  
Future challengers to anti-masking statutes, perhaps Occupiers wearing 
Guy Fawkes masks, might be able to effectively distinguish Kerik, because 
the analysis is tied so closely to the specific expressiveness of the entire 
KKK uniform.136 This would open the door to the various arguments the 
District Court made against the validity of the statute vis-à-vis the First 
Amendment. However, in Kerik, because the Knights’ wearing of the masks 
(alone) was not expressive conduct, and the statute only concerned itself 
with wearing masks in groups “rather than pure speech,” it was not invalid 
as a content-based regulation because no First Amendment protected 
activity was implicated.137 For the same reasons, there could be no basis to 
find viewpoint discrimination.138 Finally, the Second Circuit also rejected 
the District Court’s finding that the statute was invalid under the right to 
anonymous speech.139 Noting that neither the Supreme Court, nor any 
Circuit Court, had ever extended the protections against compelled 
disclosure of names in various other circumstances to one’s identity at a 
protest, the Court found the right to anonymous speech was not 
implicated.140 
Under these precedents, challengers to new or old anti-masking statutes 
face an uphill climb. However, there is solid ground on which to distinguish 
the expressive nature of anti-capitalist protesters identifiable solely and 
immediately by their Guy Fawkes masks from Klansmen in full hooded 
regalia, at least in as-applied challenges. A key could be proving the mask 
                                                
133 Id.  
134 Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 206-07 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
135 Id. at 206, 208.  
136 See Nick Thompson, Guy Fawkes Mask Inspires Occupy Protests Around The 
World, CNN (Nov. 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/3LNG-Y8AM (describing instances of 
Occupy Wall Street demonstrators wearing Guy Fawkes masks). 
137 Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK, 356 F.3d at 209-10.  
138 Id. at 210.  
139 Id. at 208-09. 
140 Id. at 209.  
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itself is speech under the requirements of the Spence test—the mask’s 
message is particular, with a great likelihood it will be understood by 
viewers. If this can be accomplished, Miller, where the mask is inherently a 
symbol of malicious intent, and Kerik, where the mask is redundant, are 
much less potent hurdles. The exceptions in the laws also allow for 
arguments that they are facially content-based regulations focused on 
political speech only and should fail under strict scrutiny, an argument with 




Nick Zerwas made an unmistakable reference when he remarked on the 
cost that Black demonstrators exercising their First Amendment rights must 
pay to secure the guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, among others. States have historically imposed a 
repressive toll—surveillance, infiltration, jail time, and blood—on political 
organizing and activity, especially by systemically oppressed groups. The 
First Amendment, for most of United States history, offered very little 
protection for people who fought for greater autonomy and equality by 
openly organizing and taking to the streets. Over the last hundred years, the 
Supreme Court, recognizing the utility of a vent in releasing increased 
pressure, has imbued the First Amendment, and other fundamental rights, 
with more robust safeguards against government infringement as the power 
of states and the federal government has increased exponentially. In recent 
decades, however, the growth of state police power has eclipsed the 
trajectory of the First Amendment as a guard of the right to dissent.  
A cursory analysis of a sample of the proposed legislation and how it 
has fared in the process shows the First Amendment is not the strongest tool 
those hoping to redirect trajectories of power, and win more control over 
their bodies, lives, and communities, possess to protect themselves from 
legislative repression. Early intervention has already proven far more 
effective—and efficient—than constitutional challenges will likely be. Bills 
increasing penalties for obstruction related offenses, trespassing, and so 
forth are unlikely to fail constitutional muster. While some of the harshest 
bills are much more suspect, activists are already facing decades in prison 
for engaging in protected activities and civil disobedience. The First 
Amendment in its modern form has not stopped the authoritarian creep of 
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141 Information current as of December 2017. 
Appendix A — Legislation by State141 
 
Arizona 




S.B. 550 (vetoed by Governor) 
H.B. 1756 (sent to Governor 4/03/17) 
  
Colorado 
S.B. 35 (passed Senate and failed in House 
Committee on State, Veterans, & Military Affairs) 
  
Florida 
S.B. 1096 (died in Criminal Justice Committee) 
  
Georgia 
S.B. 1 (passed Senate & failed on House vote) 
S.B. 160 (signed by Governor sans traffic related 
provisions on 05/08/17) 
  
Indiana 
S.B. 285 (passed Senate & referred to House 
Committee on Rules & Legislative Procedures) 
  
Iowa 




H.B. 4643 (passed House & tabled in Senate) 
H.B. 4630 (passed House & tabled in Senate) 
  
Minnesota 
H.F. 34 (introduced in Public Safety & Security 
Policy & Finance Committee) 
S.F. 148 (in Committee) 
S.F. 184 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety 
Finance and Policy Committee) 
H.F. 55 (introduced in Transportation & Regional 
Governance & Policy Committee) 
H.F. 322 (introduced in Public Safety & Security 
Policy & Finance Committee) 
H.F. 390 (introduced in Public Safety & Security 
Policy & Finance Committee) 
S.F. 676 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety 
Finance & Policy Committees) 
S.F. 679 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety 
Finance & Policy Committee) 
S.F. 918 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety 
& Finance & Policy Committee) 
H.F. 1066 (introduced in Public Safety & Security 
Policy & Finance Committees) 
 
Mississippi 
S.B. 2730 (died in Judiciary Committee) 
 
Missouri 
H.B. 179 (died in Local, State, Federal Relations 
and Miscellaneous Business Committee) 




S.B. 2492 (Passed Senate & referred to Assembly 
Governmental Operations Committee on 
03/08/17) 
S.B. 2493 (Passed Senate; in Assembly 
Committee) 








H.B. 1193 (Passed House; Failed in Senate) 
H.B. 1203 (Failed in House) 
H.B. 1293 (Effective 3/02/17) 
H.B. 1304 (Effective 3/02/17) 
H.B. 1426 (Effective 3/02/17) 
S.B. 2302 (Effective 3/01/17) 
  
Oklahoma 
H.B. 1123 (signed by Governor on 05/03/17) 
H.B. 2128 (signed by Governor on 5/15/17) 
  
Oregon 













S.B. 176 (signed by Governor on 03/27/17) 
H.B. 1145 (withdrawn from Judiciary Committee) 
 
Tennessee 
H.B. 668 (died in House Civil Justice Committee) 
S.B. 902 (signed by Governor on 04/12/17) 
S.B. 944 (introduced in Judiciary Committee) 
H.B. 1051 (signed by Governor on 04/12/17) 
  
Texas 




S.B. 1055 (failed on Senate vote) 
S.B. 1056 (died in Committee for Courts of 
Justice) 
S.B. 1057 (died in Committee for Courts of 
Justice) 
S.B. 1058 (failed on Senate vote) 
H.B. 1791 (vetoed by Governor) 
  
Washington 
S.B. 5009 (introduced in Law & Justice 
Committee)
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142 Information current as of December 2017. Legislation that fits multiple categories appears in duplicate. 
Appendix B — Legislation by Category142 
 
Anti-BDS Legislation 
New York S.B. 2492 (passed Senate & referred to 
Assembly Governmental Operations Committee) 
New York S.B. 2493 (passed Senate & referred to 
Assembly Higher Education Committee) 
New York S.B. 4837 (passed Senate & referred to 
Assembly Higher Education Committee) 
  
Anti-Masking Offense 
Missouri H.B. 179 (new misdemeanor) (died in 
Local, State, Federal Relations and Miscellaneous 
Business Committee) 
North Dakota H.B. 1304 (new misdemeanor) 
(signed by Governor on 02/23/17) 
  
Citizen or Organization Liability 
Arizona S.B. 1142 (died in House Rules 
committee after passing Senate) 
Minnesota H.F. 322 / S.F. 679 (introduced in 
House Public Safety & Security Policy & Finance 
Committee & Senate Judiciary & Public Safety 
Finance & Policy Committee) 
Oklahoma H.B. 1123 (signed by Governor on 
05/03/17) 
Oklahoma S.B. 2128 (signed by Governor on 
05/03/17) 
Pennsylvania S.B. 754 (introduced in State 
Government Committee) 
  
Driver Immunity Statutes 
Florida S.B. 1096 (died in Criminal Justice 
Committee) 
North Carolina H.B. 330 (passed House & 
referred to Senate Committee on 04/27/17) 
North Dakota H.B. 1203 (failed on vote) 
Tennessee H.B. 668 / S.B. 944 (died in House 
Civil Justice Committee & introduced in Senate 
Judiciary Committee) 
Texas H.B. 250 (pending in Judiciary & Civil 
Jurisprudence Committee) 
  
“Economic Terrorism” (ET), Trespass & 
Interfering with Industry Related Offenses 
Colorado S.B. 35 (upgraded existing 
misdemeanor to felony) (Passed Senate and failed 
in House Committee on State, Veterans, & 
Military Affairs) 
Georgia S.B. 1 (expanded existing felonies) 
(passed Senate & failed on House vote) 
North Carolina H.B. 249 (failed in Committee 
on Rules, Calendar, and Operations; re-introduced 
in Judiciary Committee) 
North Dakota 1193 (new felony) (failed on 
Senate vote after passing House) 
Oklahoma H.B. 1123 (new felonies and 
misdemeanor) (signed by Governor on 05/03/17) 
South Dakota S.B. 176 (new misdemeanors) 
(signed by Governor on 03/27/17) 
Washington S.B. 5009 (new felony) (introduced 
in Law & Justice Committee) 
 
Unlawful Assembly & Riot Related Offenses 
Arizona S.B. 1142 (new felonies) (died in House 
Rules committee after passing Senate) 
Minnesota H.F. 34 / S.F. 184 (expanded felony) 
(introduced in House Public Safety and Security 
Policy & Finance Committee & Senate Judiciary 
& Public Safety Finance & Policy Committee)  
Missouri H.B. 826 (new misdemeanor and 
felony) (died in Crime Prevention & Public Safety 
Committee) 
North Dakota H.B. 1426 (upgraded 
misdemeanor and felonies) (signed by Governor 
on 02/23/17) 
Oregon S.B. 540 (increased penalty for existing 
offense) (died in Education & Judiciary 
Committees) 
South Dakota H.B. 1145 (withdrawn from 
Judiciary Committee) 
Virginia S.B. 1055 (upgraded misdemeanor) 
(failed on Senate vote) 
Virginia S.B. 1056 (upgraded misdemeanor) 
(died in Committee for Courts of Justice) 
Virginia S.B. 1057 (upgraded felony) (died in 
Committee for Courts of Justice) 
Virginia S.B. 1058 (new felony) (failed on Senate 
vote) 
Virginia H.B. 1791 (new felonies) (vetoed by 
Governor) 
  
Traffic & Roadway Related Offenses 
Arkansas S.B. 550 (new misdemeanor) (vetoed 
by Governor) 
Arkansas H.B. 1756 (expanded misdemeanor) 
(sent to Governor 4/03/17) 
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Florida S.B. 1096 (new misdemeanor) (died in 
Criminal Justice Committee) 
Georgia S.B. 160 (mandatory minimums for 
existing offenses) (signed by Governor sans traffic 
related provisions on 05/08/17) 
Indiana S.B. 285 (new violation) (passed Senate 
& referred to House Committee on Rules & 
Legislative Procedures) 
Iowa S.F. 111 (new felony) (introduced in 
Judiciary Committee) 
Minnesota S.F. 148 / H.F. 55 (new 
misdemeanor) (introduced in Senate Judiciary & 
Public Safety & Finance & Policy Committee & 
Senate Transportation & Regional Governance & 
Policy Committee) 
Minnesota H.B. 390 / S.F. 676 (upgraded 
misdemeanors) (introduced in House Public 
Safety & Security Policy & Finance Committee & 
Senate Judiciary & Public Safety & Finance & 
Policy Committees) 
Minnesota S.F. 918 / H.F. 1066 (new 
misdemeanor) (in Committee) (introduced in 
Senate Judiciary & Public Safety & Finance & 
Policy Committee & House Public Safety & 
Security Policy & Finance Committee) 
Mississippi S.B. 2730 (new felony) (died in 
Judiciary Committee) 
Missouri H.B. 826 (new felony and 
misdemeanors) (died in Crime Prevention & 
Public Safety Committee) 
North Carolina H.B. 249 (upgraded 
misdemeanor) (failed in Committee on Rules, 
Calendar, and Operations; re-introduced in 
Judiciary Committee) 
South Dakota S.B. 176 (new misdemeanors) 
(signed by Governor on 03/27/17) 
Tennessee S.B. 902 / 1051 (upgraded 
misdemeanor) (signed by Governor on 04/12/17) 
Virginia S.B. 1058 (new felony) (died in 
Committee for Courts of Justice) 
Mass Picketing and Strike Related Offenses and 
Laws 
Arkansas S.B. 550 (new misdemeanors) (vetoed 
by Governor) 
 
Mass Picketing and Strike Related Offenses 
and Laws 
Arkansas S.B. 550 (new misdemeanors) (vetoed 
by Governor) 
Michigan H.B. 4630 (increasing fines for existing 
misdemeanors) (passed House & tabled in Senate)  
Michigan H.B. 4643 (passed House & tabled in 
Senate)
